Analyze Derek Parfits Personal Identity Essay Example

Analyze Derek Parfits Personal Identity Essay Example Analyze Derek Parfits Personal Identity Essay Analyze Derek Parfits Personal Identity Essay This essay will analyze Derek Parfits Personal Identity. In his essay, Derek Parfit explains a scenario where a brain is divided into two pieces. The two pieces of brain are then housed in two different bodies. 1 To Parfit, there are three possibilities for the survival of the identity to which the brain in question originally had. 1. The persons identity does not survive. 2. The persons identity survives as one of the two new people. 3. The persons identity survives through both new persons. Parfit rejects all three of these possibilities for various reasons. I will attempt to explain how Parfit goes about rejecting these three possibilities, and explicate what I believe Parfit overlooked. In his essay Parfit rejects the first possibility by bringing up a person who has lost half his brain. He says that it is possible for people to have half of their brain destroyed and still survive. 2 This being the case there is little difference between having half a brain transplanted and having half a brain destroyed. Either way the person still only has half a brain. Parfit also rejects the second possibility. In the second possibility the person survives as one of the two new people. Parfits rejection is based on both halves of the brain being identical. If both halves of the brain are identical, and both are transplanted successfully, then there is no reason for one to survive and the other not too. The third possibility is more difficult to resolve. Parfit rejects the notion of the survival as two people. If survival consists in the sameness of identity, then it doesnt follow that a person can survive in two people and have the same identity. On the other hand it may be possible for one person to have two bodies with a divided mind. 3 Supposing that the two people were separated for a long enough time, it stands to reason that they may end up different people. 4 This is where a major problem occurs. If possibility three is possible, it is only possible if a person survives as both new people. Parfit has rejected this claim. But he also says that two people could survive and be different. Parfit then tries to resolve this discrepancy. He brings to example two people who make up a third person. The two people can be themselves, but also comprise another person. 5 Even this doesnt seem to resolve the issue. Parfit then raises another possibility; he attempts to separate survival and identity. In other words one could survive as the two different people without being those people. This concept he calls the descendant self6, whereby a person doesnt necessarily have the same identity as either of the resulting persons. Rather, the two resulting people together make up the person. So it seems that Parfit is skirting the original question of identity. His theory of the descendant selves attempts to remove identity out of the problem and replace it with survival. I dont believe that Parfit feels identity is a necessary component in survival. Furthermore, by taking this stance, I dont think that he answers the question of personal identity. Clearly though only parts of ones body needs to survive, and I think that Parfit would agree that that is the brain. This being the case Parfit brings to example a person with epilepsy. Doctors can split the brain and create two separate spheres of consciousness. The separation of the two halves of the brain doesnt seem to matter, as long as they are in the same body. If the two brain halves are in the same body then that constitutes the same person. But what is the difference between being in the same body and not being in the same body? The only difference is that the separated halves are in different bodies. Parfit objection would be that the two people could be separated for a long period of time they would end up being different people. They may not even recognize each other if they met. Still, it doesnt mean that they are not the same person. If me right now and me sixty years from now met, we may not know or recognize one another. Is that to say that we arent the same person? I dont think that Parfit is truly interested in the problem of personal identity per se. Rather, I think that he is more interested in explaining survivability. In that it doesnt matter to Parfit that the original person survives, instead, what is important is that someone survives. Furthermore, that that someone has some relation to the original persons psychology. Moreover, that the psychological relationships are continually overlapping. 7 These overlapping relationships Parfit calls psychological continuity. I dont think that this idea of psychological continuity solves the problem of personal identity though. If we look at Parfits diagram, we would see the original person A8, and several descendant selves. 9 These descendant selves are connected to person A through psychological continuity. In this way, any person on the tree is a descendant self of A. Moreover, though these people may not be person A, and in fact are not person A, still they survive at best as part of person A. This is somewhat difficult to understand. The descendant selves are not the original person. If this is the case, how does Parfit answer the question of personal identity? The answer is that he doesnt. Or rather, that he skirts the issue. Parfit makes survivability the important issue. How is it that someone can survive into the future? Even though there is no one identical to you in the future there is psychological continuity between you and a future self. This being the case, survivability is a function of psychological continuity. This is where I think Parfits mistake is. Continuity, to me, implies an uninterrupted succession or flow. I believe the key word here is uninterrupted. Yet, in Parfits example there is an interruption. Between each of the descending selves exist differences, which create a separation. Another way to think of this is to use Parfits original example of the brain surgery. Suppose we had three people, and two of those people had their brains removed. Further suppose that we took the brain of the third person, split it half, and transplanted the halves into the two people without brains. The third possibility (which Parfit rejects) would say that the original persons identity survives through the two new people. What Parfit wants to say is that the two new people are descendant selves of the original person. Furthermore, that the two new people share psychological continuity with the original person. Though they are not the same people as the original person, the original person survives through them. Herein lies what I believe to be Parfits mistake. The two new people do not share psychological continuity with the original person. Continuity, as stated above, implies an uninterrupted succession or flow. To say that a persons psychology is continuous through the type of operation stated before isnt true. Having ones brain cut in half already implies that one wouldnt be the same person. If this were the case then personal identity wouldnt be the same either. Though some of the original persons memories and traits may survive, the original persons identity wouldnt. Ultimately, if the two new people created only share some memories and some traits of the original person, I dont think that it is enough to say that they share psychological continuity with the original person. This being the case, it also wouldnt follow that the original person survives through the two new people. A few memories and traits dont constitute survivability.